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Background
We examine land prices arising from tenure review of 
South Island high country pastoral leases (see figure 1). 
Tenure review splits the leasehold – part is converted 
to freehold ownership, and part is converted to public 
conservation land. The Crown sells its residual interest in 
the most developable part of a leasehold, and buys the 
lessee’s interest in the part with conservation value (see 
figure 2). 
Of the 77 runs that completed tenure review from 1992-
2008, at least 28 new landowners have on-sold 176 
parcels of newly freeheld land (see figure 3). In gross, 
these 28 new owners paid the Crown $6.9M to freehold, 
and have realized $134 million after on-selling 45,266ha, 
44% of their new freeholds.
Hypothesis: 
Tenure review creates rents enjoyed by former high 
country pastoral lessees.
Dependent variable = ln(Pos / Pf )
Pos = Price/ ha obtained when new freeholder on-sells 
land.
Pf = Price/ha the new freeholder paid to attain freehold.
Data sourced from Salesview Custom Software.
1.9 < Pos / Pf < 26,968. Median value = 995.
Discussion
The large discrepancies between Pos and Pf  are 
consistent with former lessees enjoying large rents 
after tenure review. 
The strong negative correlation between ln(size) and  
ln(Pos / Pf )  is consistent with the option to change 
land use allowing rents to arise. Location and time 
elapsed were lesser predictors, yet still significant. 
Some argue the dramatic price rise between 
privatization and onselling is not evidence of 
rents, but has other explanations. But results are 
inconsistent with other explanations proposed by high 
country farmers and the government agency in charge. 
Data Summary Table 
Name of lease hectares 
privatised
Gross price 
for freehold 
hectares 
on-sold
Gross price on-
sold land
POS/Pf
Alphaburn 3365 $267,500 193 $10,100,000 658
Closeburn 930 $199,889 14 $17,696,000 6,089
Hillend 2659 $336,000 2443 $26,200,000 85
Pukaki Downs 3722 $120,000 583 $4,665,000 248
Rhoboro Downs 4648 $55,000 127 $1,900,000 1,262
Woodbine 338 $110,000 0 $100,000 3,033
Bendigo 8727 $172,500 624 $4,685,000 380
Cone Peak 2181 $350,000 40 $1,650,000 257
Eastburn-Waitiri 5910 $535,000 1810 $9,700,000 59
Glenroy 1973 $400,000 13 $425,400 159
Midrun-Lake McKay 5372 $179,375 1 $492,000 11,630
Mt Pisa I & II 4633 $413,000 12 $1,204,845 1,097
Mt Rosa 1388 $155,556 53 $7,521,000 1,265
Queensberry Hills 2905 $191,000 1792 $7,347,500 62
Spotts Creek 3344 $282,600 3304 $2,030,000   7
Wentworth 3840 $351,111 3432 $5,547,000 18
Ardgour 3719 $640,000 229 $1,466,000 37
Avalon 1352 $134,000 1341 $2,264,000 17
Ben Ohau 4375 $169,500 3707 $6,047,000 42
Blackstone Hill 2684 $175,000 1055 $129,000 2
Cairnmuir 4437 $141,000 4065 $4,914,000 38
Earnscleugh 16410 $608,889 15344 $1,624,000 3
Glencreag-Camberleigh 922 $310,000 922 $1,751,000 6
Halwyn 3713 $124,444 624 $1,397,500 67
Mataura Valley 4322 $164,858 4357 $9,000,000 54
Omahau Downs 165 $31,000 6 $1,819,000 1,697
Raglan Run 1583 $84,500 1584 $2,000,000 24
Waiorau 2691 $191,000 4 $785,000 2,749
Sum 102306 $6,892,722 47678 $134,460,245
Explanatory Variables.
ln(size) = log of onsold parcel size. 
Location = 1 if within 10km of Queenstown or Wanaka, 
and/or within sight of any of the following lakes: Wanaka, 
Wakatipu, Hawea, Tekapo, or Pukaki.
Time elapsed = Years between privatization and onsale.
Conclusions
Tenure review is inefficient for at least 3 reasons:
a) The option to acquire large rents via tenure review could artificially inflate the price of pastoral 
leases.  
b) This inflation makes tenure review increasingly expensive for the Crown. Therefore the price to 
purchase freehold should not be based on market prices for leaseholds in course, because the latter 
includes the value of the option to freehold, apply to subdivide, and sell.
c) The potential for large rents after tenure review could encourage rent seeking by existing lessees. 
This could manifest in lessees’ destroying conservation values on lease-hold land, rendering it 
devoid of conservation value and suitable for privatization. 
Constant ln (Size) Location Time R2 SER BIC
 elapsed
7.95 -0.74 --- --- 0.794 0.950 242
(0.07) (0.03)
7.54 -0.71 0.53 --- 0.806 0.923 239
(0.17) (0.03) (0.18)
7.11 -0.72 0.47 0.08  0.817 0.894 236
(0.18) (0.04) (0.18) (0.03)
 7.42 -0.81 0.14† 0.09 0.818 0.892 235
(0.16) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
† Variable is ln(Size) x Location.
Note. N=174; sample omits 2 large negative residual outliers. 
Regressions estimated via OLS using TSP 4.5. 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
SER = standard error of the regression. BIC = Schwarz criterion.
Results
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Figure 1: Richmond Station and environs,  
Lake Tekapo, before the division of ownership.
Figure 2: Richmond Station, months after division.  
Fence separates newly privatised land from new 
public conservation land.
Figure 3: Queensberry Hills Station, 5 years 
after division.  Change in land use possible after 
privatisation.
